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The United States of America is engaged in struggle against Islamic extremism, defined as a global war on terrorism by the Bush administration, in the wake of the terrifying events of 9/11. This phrase has been identified with U.S. policy and national security strategy decisions that are perceived as either critical to long term U.S. national interests or as an affront to America's traditional values, depending on the perspective of the beholder. The global war on terrorism has been coined as a strategy in the fight against terrorism, a declaration of war against Al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, a legal term for the purpose of leveraging war powers, and a pre-text for strategic and foreign policy decisions. This project examines the terminology from these perspectives and assesses its significance as a strategic approach, its impacts on U.S. government and society, and a potential way ahead for success in this global struggle faced by America today.
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AMERICA'S JIHAD
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush declared the strikes by Al Qaeda were "more than acts of terror. They were acts of war." 1 An unscrupulous enemy had attacked the shores of the United States, killed innocent civilians, and provoked our entry into a struggle which would be cast as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). This phrase would prove to be far more than a bumper sticker response to communicate a theme to an anxious public. GWOT would prove to be a battle cry to a wide spectrum of audiences, both home and abroad, and it would frame an agenda that would lead the United States into a perpetual struggle against a form of radical Islam that is not bounded by the borders of a nation state or organized under the flag of a recognized national capitol.
The Bush administration's global war on terrorism strategy aspired to galvanize Americans and foreign allies against a common enemy, but the high costs of implementing the strategy have subjected GWOT to criticism and controversy. Over the past six years the administration has been under constant pressure from divisive political foes, disenfranchised international allies, questioning legal scholars, unrelenting media interests, and an impatient and fearful public. Under the banner of GWOT the nation has plunged into war in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously beginning a process of restructuring its homeland security apparatus, transforming its military, modifying its privacy laws and civil liberties, and re-assessing its international alliances and allegiances. If U.S. citizens accept that the global war on terrorism is a war unlike any other, then they must also accept responsibility to review the effort and determine whether the wide ranging costs are commensurate with the investment. In doing so, America will reconcile its struggle with terrorism in the context of policies historically defined against the backdrop of conventional war. The nation thus determines whether the opportunity costs associated with prosecution of the global war on terrorism are effectively securing the homeland, or marginalizing traditional national values.
This research project examines key U.S. government and Bush administration, policy and strategy decisions in a complex struggle that has been defined as the global war on terrorism. The project assesses its significance as a strategic and doctrinal framework, and its impacts on U.S. foreign policy and civil liberties. Perle characterized the issue appropriately when he stated that the GWOT message sends a mixed signal because it "has not succeeded in inspiring the belief that we face an existential threat…the term 'war on terrorism' leaves the enemy ill defined." clarified." 21 Power's assessment is that GWOT gave birth to an agenda that needlessly dismissed old rules of criminal justice, setback US diplomatic relationships with allies, exploited international treaties and organizations, and led to dramatic expansions of The premise that the global war on terrorism is a 'war' is a subject of debate that provides compelling arguments from all sides of the issue. The enemy is a non-state entity who resists through both asymmetric and irregular methods is forcing scholars of war to reassess doctrine and determine whether there is room for such an untidy arrangement. Claims that the GWOT mantra is a means to consolidate power and influence, and promote the policy aims of the administration is evidenced in significant levels of expansion of executive branch wartime powers. The credibility of the GWOT campaign is supported by the Bush administration's leveraging the instruments of war through a legitimate combination of public support, congressional funding, and judicial approval.
A Case for Preemption
The strategic policy of preemptive wartime doctrine has come under scrutiny by international legal scholars like Richard Falk of Princeton University, who states that the American people and American interests, the government is obligated to "use all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage." 25 While the text further states that the preference will always be for non-military actions to succeed first, the policy is clear in its presumption that there exist few options for preempting a potential terrorist attack with WMD, than preemption and action. 26 This policy of preemption, often identified as the center-piece of the so called "Bush Doctrine," has served as a rallying point for critics and supporters from both ends of the political and ideological spectrum to speculate as to the legality, the advisability, and the context of preemption as policy. 27 Noted defense strategist Colin Gray, a dual citizen of and advisor to both U.S.
and British governments, makes a distinction between preemption and prevention, stating that preemption has never been a questionable issue either morally or legally.
Gray states that preemption, as defined by policy strategists, is "to launch an attack against an attack that one has incontrovertible evidence is either actually underway or has been ordered." 28 Gray states that preemption was a widely understood by the United Nations as an acceptable concept during the Cold War, referring to the first use of force in the face of an imminent enemy attack. Gray bluntly claims that preemption is related directly to self defense. 29 Prevention, on the other hand, is the issue Gray perceives to be at the heart of the GWOT example, and what the Bush administration actually refers to when it calls for "the occasional necessity for preemption." 30 The fundamental difference is that launching a preventive war or a preventive strike must be based on a "specific purpose of forestalling an extraordinary danger." 31 In Gray's opinion, preventive war is a "frightening concept" that can realistically be waged by strong states, but must be used judiciously. 32 Gray perceives as reasonable, the contention that "because the United States has an extraordinary responsibility for maintaining world order, it is permitted to act, indeed it sometimes has to act, in ways that would be unacceptable if practiced by others." Whether a policy of preemption, (or preventive war), by the U.S. is deemed questionable under UN charter, justifiable in the context of an emerging twenty-first century terrorist threat, or even desirable policy in coalition building, the conventional wisdom among supporters of preemption remains that preventive war is a strategy that must be used selectively, and likely resides only with the great world powers. 39 Supporters of the Bush policy refer to the convoluted actions of the UN as their credibility. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council issued a resolution recognizing the United States' right of self defense against a terrorist threat.
The UN defined the terrorist actions as "a threat to international peace and security." Many nations interpret the UN charter as a legal document that restricts the actions to wage preventive war without the blessing of the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC). The Bush administration rejected this interpretation in favor of the right to defend its citizens against a potential terrorist threat that could lead to mass casualties many times greater than the attacks of 9/11. 42 This Bush interpretation supports the concept that the U.S. has the right to take active measures in the interest of its security. The Bush concept discounts the validity of the Security Council to interpret U.S. actions legally or morally when each of the permanent members has its own security interests at the forefront of any issue on which they vote. 43 Prior to the invasion of Iraq, liberal political activist Ralph Nader was one of the most vocal public figures to suggest that the Bush administration's argument for the invasion of Iraq had little to do with the pretext of pursuing GWOT. Nader highlighted flimsy intelligence assessments and a questionable terrorist nexus as flawed justification for the invasion of Iraq. 44 Nader predicted the invasion of Iraq would "increase global terrorism…destabilize the Middle East region, undermine [GWOT] and distract from the Israeli -Palestinian conflict." 45 Initially discounted in mainstream politics as a radical, Nader's opinions have gained increasing credibility as the invasion into Iraq brought more terrorism into the region and reportedly emboldened the recruiting efforts of the al Qaeda movement. 46 In Islamic militants is in its early rounds," but for the U.S. to succeed it will take a wide coalition.
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The alienation of traditional allies has been an unfortunate and deleterious result of the global war on terrorism. In his book, Winning the Right War, Phillip Gordon points to the Bush campaign platform of 2000 as an indication of ideology that would become policy. The administration's willingness to act alone through the premise that "U.S.
foreign policy goals could only be realized through decisive American leadership and, if necessary, through unilateral action." 58 The problem, according to Gordon, is that after more than six years, the U.S. is standing alone. By "neglecting diplomacy, ignoring the pronouncement that "making policy is not a popularity contest," the Bush administration fails to take into account that when key political leaders from other countries "feel that standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States is a political liability, low favorability ratings can indeed hinder America's ability to solve global challenges." 62 At the crux of the negative view that exists of America is Washington's unwillingness to grant due process to terrorist suspects, along with violations of human rights during interrogations.
Smith warns that European audiences view these issues as the epitome of hypocrisy and proves there is a "gap between U.S. stated policies and action." 63 Smith concludes that there is a case for a revitalization of the war on terror based on America welcoming debate among coalition allies over strategies associated with the GWOT. Key among the initiatives would be a U.S. commitment to human rights in the conduct of counter terrorism. 64 This approach would restore the "moral authority" that Smith claims is "eroding, jeopardizing the transatlantic relationship and threatening U.S. national security." the people and its government, and so ought to be regulated by clear, strict rules defining the power given by the principal to its agent." 71 Yoo contends that any and all efforts that apply criminal justice rules to al Qaeda associated terrorists and affiliates would both impede the apprehension of the enemy and compromise the necessary secrecy of military initiatives. 72 From Yoo's standpoint, the war on terror is a temporary condition of war that requires extraordinary powers to be in place to efficiently eradicate a threat to the very core of America's existence.
Writing for the Washington Post, Zbigniew Brzezinski claims that GWOT created a culture of fear that has become so elevated that it has had a "pernicious impact on
American democracy" which has undermined the nation's ability to face the actual challenges associated with terrorism. 73 According to Brzezinski, the American public has been brainwashed into believing the terrorist threat is so pervasive, that paranoia has developed leading to a level of security procedures that wasted millions of dollars of taxpayer money while "contributing to a siege mentality." Koechler concludes that the intensity of the measures taken is more attributable to a totalitarian system than that of the enlightened West. 79 Koechler fears that there is a building pressure in the U.S. for its citizens to come into line with the government's general views about the enemy, marginalizing those who fail to conform. 80 The end result of this panic is a "forcible consensus" on the nation's strategy and policies. as the PATRIOT Act and NSA surveillance measures, are violations of law, when in fact these actions were supported by lawmakers and judges overwhelmingly. 83 In addressing the ultimate value of civil liberties and national values at a time of emergency, Posner and Vermeule surmise that "most people do not want to live in a society that protects civil liberties at an extremely high price" that jeopardizes their security. 84 Posner and Vermuele conclude that it is a fallacy to assume that "whatever package of civil liberties happens to exist at a time a terrorist threat arises must be maintained at all costs…[because] a government that does not respond as a threat increases is "pathologically rigid, not enlightened." 85 In the aftermath of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of 9/11 there is little doubt whether America needed to respond in a lasting and significant way. There is also little doubt that those responses will be reconciled, ensuring their consequences do not go beyond reason in protecting freedom, at the cost of freedom.
Conclusion
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 presented the United States with its greatest challenge since the end of the Cold War. A seemingly invincible sense of national security and safety was shattered by an asymmetric and irregular threat that brought a war to the U.S. home front for which the nation was unprepared. In response, the Bush led government declared the global war on terrorism had commenced against the worst brand of Islamic extremism, led by an al Qaeda master. This 'war' on terrorism is justifiable, and requires the nation's leaders to take aggressive actions to defeat al Qaeda and ensure the safety of U.S. citizens, as well as to protect America's interests abroad. It is reasonable to question the actions taken to date, and to ensure that the framework being established to adapt to these new rules of war does not sacrifice the same freedoms we are attempting to protect. GWOT requires the military instrument be leveraged to take the fight to the enemy on distant battlefields, but it also requires that those battlefields be carefully assessed to ensure the effort does not empower the very enemy we are attempting to eliminate. As the world's sole superpower, the United
States must continue to lead against the terrorist scourge, but the U.S. must exhibit as much patience and imagination towards building international consensus and multilateralism, as it does to act alone in the face of indecisiveness and political cowardice. American leadership must not lose sight of the fact that no strategy can be formed without consulting the nation's values. America has the economic and industrial might to erect new buildings, the ingenuity and flexibility to alter its security environment, and the courage and strength to sacrifice its young men and women in the defense of its citizens. However, mortgaging the principles established by the nation's founders in the pursuit of short term gains will result in a series of successful battles, followed by a lost war.
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